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The socio-cultural evolution of our species
The history and possible future of human societies and civilizations
Jürgen Klüver
M any biologists and social scientists have noted that with the develop ment of human culture, the biologi cal evolution of Homo sapiens was usurped by sociocultural evolution. the construc tion of artificial environments and social structures created new criteria for selec tion, and biological fitness was replaced by 'cultural fitness', which is often different for different cultures and is generally not meas ured by the number of offspring. Moreover, the mechanism of sociocultural evolution is different from the model of biological evolution that was proposed by charles Darwin (1809 Darwin ( -1882 , and refined by many others. in essence, sociocultural evolution is 'lamarckian' in nature-it is an exam ple of acquired inheritance, as described by the French naturalist JeanBaptiste lamarck (1744-1829)-because humans are able to pass on cultural achievements to the next generation.
yet, the idea that cultural fitness has replaced biological fitness does not fully take into account the thousands of years of human biological evolution that occurred long before sociocultural evolution, in its strictest sense, took its course. Modern Homo sapiens first appeared about 200,000 years ago; however, sociocultural evolu tion only began about 10,000 years ago, when early hunter-gatherer societies began to change their simple forms of segmentary social differentiation during the socalled neolithic revolution, which was mainly caused by the invention of agriculture and cattle breeding. in mathematical terms, one could say that human biological evolution created an attractor: a stable state impervious to change. Various mathematical models of biological evolution, namely the genetic algorithm (Holland, 1975) , show that the generation of such an attractor is the usual result of evolutionary processes (Klüver, 2000) . nevertheless, sociocultural evolu tion did not end biological evolution; in fact, for most of the time that Homo sapiens has existed, sociocultural evolution has been so slow that it could not have affected bio logical evolution. Here, i attempt to explain why modern humans existed long before sociocultural evolution really began.
What does sociocultural evolution mean? there have been many attempts to define this ambiguous concept (trigger, 1998) , which have interpreted the term 'evolution' in a lit eral sense and assumed that sociocultural evolution is determined by the same mecha nisms as its biological counterpart. it is true that the evolution of human societies and cul tures shares some similarities with biological evolution, but in many respects these two are not the same. therefore, at the outset, it is nec essary to give a precise definition of evolution in the field of human societies (Klüver, 2002) . S ociocultural evolution, as the name implies, has two dimensions: social and cultural. Some of the great social theorists of the last century defined 'culture' in terms of the generally accepted know ledge of a certain society or social group (Habermas, 1981; giddens, 1984) . under this definition, 'knowledge' is not limited to natural and social phenomena, but includes, for example, religion, worldviews and moral values. Similarly, 'accepted' does not imply that such knowledge is true accord ing to scientific standards-for example, the Judaeochristian belief that god cre ated the world-but only that it is accepted within one culture as 'true'. the definition of 'social' naturally refers to social structures. 'Social' can be defined as the set of rules that govern all social interactions in a cer tain society. the separation of power into legislative, judicative and executive arms of government in modern democracies is such a rule, as is the rule to drive on the right hand side of the road in most countries. in mathematical terms, we can then define a society (S ) using the equation S = (St, C), where C refers to culture and St refers to social structure. culture and social structure are, of course, abstracts that cannot be quantified and must instead be translated into empiri cal categories-namely, observable actions by, and interactions of, social actors. in a metatheoretical sense, this transforms the concepts of culture and social structure into an action theory because only individual actors can be the units of an empirical social science. the main concepts here are social roles and their occupants.
consider, for example, the social role of a medical doctor. a doctor is characterized by his or her knowledge of disease diag nosis, how to choose appropriate thera pies and how to tell the patient to follow the therapy. However, the role of the doc tor is also defined by specific rules-the Hippocratic oath, for example-and by specific laws about how to treat patients, or how to adhere to health insurance or national regulations. Similarly, the role of a university professor is defined by specific scientific knowledge and specific rules of interaction with respect to, for example, teaching, publishing and dealing with
In essence, socio-cultural evolution is 'Lamarckian' in nature […] because humans are able to pass on cultural achievements to the next generation science & society sp e cial issue university administration. We can therefore define a social role (r) as r = (k, ru), where k is the rolespecific knowledge and ru represents the rolespecific rules of social interaction (Berger & luckmann, 1966) .
an individual in a society is a social actor when he or she occupies a specific social role, which is not necessarily a pro fessional role. there are other social roles such as being a parent or being a member of a political party, and it is relatively easy to define the social rules and rolespecific knowledge of these positions. therefore, we can define a society as a web of social roles, the occupants of which interact according to the rules and to the knowledge that define these roles. a society is then produced and reproduced through the rolespecific interactions of the role occupants. in many cases, the social structure and culture of a society merely reproduce-that is, they do not change notably. yet, sometimes roles and interactions change markedly, and the social structure and culture change accord ingly. Such times are called periods of reform or-in the extreme-revolutions. now that we have defined what we mean by a society-based on culture and social structure-we can define socio cultural evolution as the creation and change of social roles through new know ledge that changes and creates social rules. Sociocultural evolution, then, alters and enlarges a society in the two dimensions of social structure and culture. the driving force is new ideas in the cultural dimen sion and the ensuing changes to the social structure that create new social rules of interaction. Social roles in a societal sys tem therefore "become the equivalent of genes in a genetic system" (read, 2005); however, this is only a formal equivalence, as the evolutionary mechanisms in these cases operate differently. W hen we speak of social roles, we must make an important distinction. on the one hand, some social roles-those of artisans, crafts people, artists, technicians, scientists or entrepreneurs, for example-are defined by 'creative tasks', which expand the culture of society. cultural evolution is therefore only possible if the occupants of creative roles enjoy a certain degree of freedom. on the other hand, there are roles-those of priests, politicians or teachers, for exam ple-that serve to maintain social tradi tions, culture and social structures. We can call these 'maintenance roles' in contrast to the 'creative roles'. these are essential for the integration of a society because tradi tional norms and values allow a society to maintain its societal identity.
the crucial factor for the evolutionary potential of a society, then, is the relation ship between creative roles and mainte nance roles. if the maintenance roles have a strong influence on the creative roles, the occupants of creative roles cannot ful fil their creativity and the development of culture stagnates; a society gets caught in a cultural evolutionary attractor. the relation ship between these two classes of roles is the decisive parameter for the evolution ary power of a society, which can be called an evolutionary parameter (Ep) and deter mines the evolutionary fate of a society. the ultimately unsuccessful attempts of the catholic church to silence proponents of the heliocentric model of the planetary sys tem-most notably giordano Bruno (1548-1600) and galileo galilei (1564-1642)-is an example of an unfavourable Ep. a society must have a certain degree of heterogeneity with respect to the existence of different roles and the social 'distance' between the two kinds of roles. if a society is too homo geneous, sociocultural evolution will stop sooner or later.
looking at historical examples can vali date this general hypothesis about the logic of sociocultural evolution. Starting in the fourteenth century, the European nations entered a period characterized by reforms, revolutions and scientific progress-known respectively as the renaissance, the reformation and the Enlightenment-and eventually evolved into modern Western societies. the technological and social competitors of Europe during the Middle ages-notably feudal china and the islamic societies-did not change in the same way because they did not have the Ep values of European societies, despite the fact that they were culturally and scientifically more advanced than feudal Europe. the main rea son for this was that the occupants of creative roles in Europe enjoyed a larger degree of freedom than those in rival societies (Klüver, 2002; needham, 1970) . in particular, the large trading cities of the Hanse, the Flemish cities and the cities of northern italy were centres of cultural growth with a certain political autonomy. this environment gave the occupants of creative social roles the benefit of greater freedom from the feudal political powers and the catholic church. this political and social structure had no parallels in the other great cultures. o n the basis of this hypothesis, our research group constructed math ematical models of sociocultural evolution, the socalled sociocultural algorithm (Sca) and the expanded socio cultural cognitive algorithm (Scca). these are multiagent systems that consist of arti ficial actors. Each actor is represented by a combination of different neural nets, and the social relations between the actors are modelled by a cellular automaton and a Boolean net (Klüver, 2002; Klüver et al, 2003) . Each actor is able to occupy a certain social role, can learn from others and can generate new ideas-of course, in an ideal ized and simplified manner. the sum of all the ideas that these actors generate is the level of the respective culture. according to the general evolutionary hypothesis, the actors, if they occupy a creative role, develop new ideas in proportion to the influence of the occupants of maintenance roles. We ran the models with different Ep values and different numbers of actors ranging from 100 to more than 1,000,000. one important result was that the number of actors had no significant impact on the results-the evolutionary logic operated in small or large artificial societies.
one typical result that we observed was a socalled toynbee development, named after the British historian arnold toynbee who showed that this is the fate of all known cultures (toynbee, 1934-39; Fig 1) . this artificial culture grows quickly but eventually slows down and stagnates. Most Ep values led to this development in our simulations, which shows, at least in part, the significance of Ep values and provides an explanation for the historical processes.
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sp e c i a l i s su e only a few evolutionarily favourable Ep values were able to generate a different image (Fig 2) . in these cases, the artificial culture did not stop, but was able to continue to advance its cultural growth for as long as it existed. this might be the fate of Western culture, as its growth, particularly in science and tech nology, shows no detectable limits at present. again, the reason for this is the decisive role of the Ep and the relatively large degree of freedom that the occupants of creative roles enjoy in the West. in addition, we assume that the Ep values themselves changed dur ing European cultural development because the current values are even more favour able than those during the Medieval ages. in other words, the Ep values start a process of sociocultural evolution and are them selves changed by this process-an evolution of evolution. t he general hypothesis about socio cultural evolution, the historical data and our simulations can apparently explain human history as an evolutionary process. in particular, they can explain the special path of European and, subsequently, Western culture. they might also answer the question raised at the beginning of this article: why did it take such a long time before socio cultural evolution started at the beginning of the neolithic revolution?
Early hunter-gatherer societies, or seg mentary differentiated tribal societies as they are called in sociology, are homogeneous. there is little differentiation of social roles, which are mostly based on gender and age. the creative potential of these early humans could not unfold; small degrees of labour division did not allow for special roles and a common worldview of animistic religions further hindered individual thinking. it took a long time for these societies to become sufficiently heterogeneous to generate the creative achievements of the neolithic revolution, which, in turn, changed the social structure of societies. the segmen tary differentiated societies became strati fied into social hierarchies and allowed a significant division of labour. yet it took a long time to achieve this stage of socio cultural evolution-and many tribal societies did not reach it at all-because only small processes of differentiation took place and creative individuals could only slowly create new ideas in their respective society. the long period of time between the biological emer gence of Homo sapiens and the neolithic revolution was necessary to allow these slow processes to generate a sufficiently hetero geneous society that could move to the next step in the evolutionary process. in other words, the neolithic revolution could only take place when some societies were suf ficiently differentiated to allow for individ ual creative processes. Moreover, it can be assumed that the initial Ep values of the tribal societies did not significantly change with the slow growth of human culture. t he decisive question is, of course, whether this model of sociocultural evolution can help us to make some educated guesses about the possible future of mankind. Will the process of globalization lead to a world culture that is characterized by the Western way? in theoretical sociol ogy, we call this the hypothesis of univer sal modernization, which implies that only Western societies are truly modern ones and that the process of modernization will change all societies until they become mod ern in the Western sense, albeit with local variants. this classical hypothesis dates back to the Enlightenment, and was formulated in its most influential form by the social theo rists Karl Marx (1818 -1883 ) and Max Weber (1864 -1920 . of course, the universal mod ernization hypothesis was, and still is, much (Huntington, 1996) . although i cannot discuss this and other criticisms of the modernization hypo thesis for reasons of space, i can provide empirical data to validate the hypothesis, and make a methodical proposal based on the model of sociocultural evolution and the Scca program.
the European, and eventually Western, process of modernization is characterized by certain economic, political, educational and genderbased criteria that are indica tors of modern development. if we apply these criteria to the developmental proc esses in different countries, we can detect astonishing parallels to Western history (oesterdiekhoff, 2003) . the economical relevance of the agrarian sector is decreas ing in developing countries, even in africa, whereas industry is gaining in importance. the same trend is valid for urbanization processes: in all developing countries, the rural population is decreasing as large cities emerge, just as happened in Europe in the eighteenth century. in most places, birth rates are also steadily declining-a trend that has been observed in Western countries since the nineteenth century. the mean marriage age of women is ris ing, which is certainly one cause of the decline in the birth rate and an impor tant indicator of an increasing degree of female autonomy. the average number of democratic or semidemocratic socie ties is increasing-in which 'democratic' means adopting the Western model of a parliamentary democracy. the levels of literacy and the number of participants in higher education are increasing in most countries, and many rapidly developing countries are investing massively in science and technology-not only large nations such as china and india, but also various South american countries. all of the trends that are now visible in developing coun tries were seen previously in Europe and north america as they progressed towards modern Western culture. a lthough there are certainly other factors at work, this selection shows that many countries that are on their way to modernization follow the path of Western societies. Even politi cally regressive processes, for example the rise of islamic theocracies, are expectedindeed, European countries experienced regressive fascist movements or periods of stagnation. Modernization as a form of socio cultural evolution is not a linear process. as a preliminary summary, it seems that Marx, Weber and the other adherents of the uni versal modernization theory are right. at least, the data are more compatible with the universalistic theory of modernization than with its rivals.
Furthermore, our Scca model provides support for this theory. the theoretical founda tion of the model is the assumption that socio cultural evolution depends on an increasing degree of role autonomy in important social domains. in particular, this assumption can explain the fact that the process of moderni zation emerged in Europe before it became the core of Western culture. if these theoreti cal and mathematical assumptions are cor rect, the validity of the universalistic theory of modernization-the question of the final sociocultural character that will result from globalization processes-can be analysed in a twofold manner.
Empirical data from developing coun tries indicate that there is a growing trend in favour of role autonomy-again referring to gender roles and the rise of higher educa tion. overall, women are becoming more autonomous, and education is emancipating itself from religious and political influences in developing countries. again, women's rights and the introduction of universal education marked important points in the history and development of Western coun tries. Such data can then be inserted into simulations, such as our Sca or Scca, to predict roughly the probable development of these countries. clearly, even such micro sociologically based simulation programs can only give predictions about probable developments, but this is still better than a 'best guess' or wishful thinking. in any case, the future of our species depends on more factors than can be cov ered in this article. yet, the social future of mankind is probably a global society based on the traditions of Western societies with local adaptations. neither china nor india will become a mirror of the uSa, but simi larly neither germany nor France is such a mirror. in the end, i believe, Marx and Weber will be proved right.
